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Achilles’ last stand: Institutionalising dissent in Homer’s Iliad 
 
 
 
Debate in the Iliad – what form it takes, what significance that might have, whether or 
not it even exists – has been a matter of some controversy. One approach has been to 
examine debate in terms of a formal social context and to extrapolate from this some 
kind of political or – according to other accounts – pre-political community that the Iliad 
preserves.1 Scholars, have, however come up with very different ideas about how to 
describe that society, how to interpret that depiction, or even whether such attempts are 
fruitful.2 An alternative approach focuses on the form of the speeches and analyses them 
as the production of thesis and antithesis: on these terms the cut-and-thrust of debate is 
understood as a form of proto-rhetorical theory.3  
                                                
1 Much work derives from the anthropologically influenced French school. The Homeric agora: R. Martin 
(1951); Ruzé (1997). Institutions in general: Detienne (1996[1967]); Vernant (1983[1965]); Carlier (1996). 
The importance of law: Gernet (1955), (1982).  
2 Is there a polis (Raaflaub (1997)), or not a polis (Finley (2002[1954]))? Does the society depicted reflect 
elitist conservatism (Morris (1986)), or the beginnings of a class struggle (Rose (1997))? On the utility of 
talking about “Homeric society”: Raaflaub (1998) (for); Snodgrass (1974) (against). Scodel (2002) 174ff., 
warns of interpreting the Homeric epics as ideological productions: the plurality of voices tells against 
conceiving the texts as having been produced with “propagandistic intent” (179). 
3 The Homeric assemblies sort out alternatives; the alternation between argument and counter-argument, 
constructs a rational, consensus-oriented discourse: Hölkeskamp (1998) 36, 39. Hölkeskamp’s 
understanding of the agon as the method of opposing arguments, by which a rhetra – a binding word or 
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All this seems far removed from debate as it is represented in the narrative, 
which is the subject of this paper. I begin with four preliminary propositions. Previous 
approaches have tended to homogenise different scenes of debate, with little regard to 
differences in structure or context.4 My first point, therefore, is to pay careful attention to the 
differing circumstances and form(s) for debate; given the limited space here, this means focussing 
on debate among the Achaeans.5 The means by which one is able to identify scenes of 
assembly, and then to observe and account for the differences between them, must begin 
with the language itself, namely the term agora (Homeric ajgorhv). Looking at the 
instances where this term occurs in the context of Achaeans doing debate gives us four 
assemblies, in books one, two, nine and nineteen. 
                                                                                                                                      
covenant – is forged by the text, seems too clean-cut and cut off from the drama. Lohmann (1970) is less 
reductive in his analysis of how speeches, in the way that they are structured, assist the weighing-up of 
arguments. 
4 Ruzé (1997) 35, taking the assemblies en masse, concludes that procedure is already fixed. In his review 
Goldhill (1999) complains that an approach in which “the Homeric poems are raided for all indications of 
formal decision-making bodies” runs the risk of “failing to account for ‘pouvoir’ and ‘délibération’ in 
action” (151, 152, my italics). For further discussion and bibliography, see: Momigliano (1973); Taplin 
(1992) 49; Hammer (1997b) 1-4nn.1-18, (2002) 19-26; Haubold (2000) 11nn.46, 47. R. Martin (1951) 20 
warns against treating the assemblies as “une source de documents homogènes”. 
5 Scholars have tended to treat debate among the Achaeans and Trojans as the same: Hall (1989) 15; Scodel 
(2002) 96f.; Hammer (2002) 47. See, however, Mackie (1996), who identifies key features of each group to 
argue that discourse fundamentally differs between the two: the Achaeans speak politically, the Trojans 
poetically; Sale (1994), who in contrast argues that the Achaeans are more “manifestly monarchical” (11) 
by being dominated by Agamemnon (21-47). I deal more fully with the question of the institutional 
difference between the two groups in a forthcoming book. 
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In and of itself, however, a word carries little significance; only when words are 
interpreted alongside each other is meaning generated.6 So too with Homeric formulae, 
scholarship on which has come a long way since being first examined by Parry and made 
largely dependent on metre.7 In the present case, the term agora by itself defines the event 
of an assembly of people, or its location.8 More important is to ask how an assembly is 
set up, when, by whom, and with what effect. On this basis, each of the four assemblies 
is marked by the formula: “x called y to an assembly”.9 Such a phrase is not simply 
formulaic; rather, it provides a particular interpretative framework by means of which 
both internal and external audiences can realise when an assembly is going on and assess 
what happens as a result when one is in progress. This brings me to my second point: 
that the phraseology surrounding the agora marks it out as a special, institutional, space. 
Following on from this, we can then ask what is special about that location or, in 
other words, what kind of institution is being represented? One thing to note, for 
example, is how two distinct groups, and the relationship between them, are marked out: 
the individual who convokes the assembly and the group gathered (the Achaean laos). 
According to Johannes Haubold, the laos signify an undifferentiated pre-political social 
mass who rely (in epic) upon a leader, “the shepherd of the people”, for protection.10 My 
third point, then, is that convoking an assembly establishes a special arena, in which the relationship 
                                                
6 “Meaning – in the sense of dictionary meaning – means nothing; it only has the potential for meaning:” 
Morson (1981) 6, based on Bakhtin (1981). 
7 Foley (1999) esp. 13-34; Scodel (2002) esp. 1-2. 
8 Benveniste (1969). 
9 For example, th'/ dekavth/ d j ajgorhvnde kalevssato lao;n  jAcilleuv", 1.54. 
10 Haubold (2000) 1-54. 
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between the leader and his people is examined, questioned, forged.11 On the one hand, with one 
exception no individual addresses the assembled body qua hero:12 scenes of assembly 
investigate how the leaders relate to their group.13 On the other hand, the act of assembly 
constructs the laoi themselves as a united and cohesive group, in contrast to elsewhere in 
the epic where they remain largely silent. Clearly they do not play an active role in the 
assembly; the leaders dominate the speaking arena and the group do not even possess the 
power of ratifying policy.14 Nevertheless, their reactions are important. No speaker in the 
Achaean assembly can afford to ignore the people.15 
                                                
11 The assembly “opens a space in which the joint efforts of shepherd and group are co-ordinated with the 
aim of ensuring the success of social life”: Haubold (2000) 35; Hölkeskamp (1998) 33 identifies the agora as 
centre of the ordered world and place of common action. Once the agora is dissolved and the laoi disperse, 
the speaking agent returns to acting as an individual: at 19.276ff., when the laos go off to eat, Achilles 
continues his fast in mourning for his friend; cf. 1.305ff., 9.79ff. 
12 The exception is Agamemnon (Il. 1.102), which may not be coincidental given his attempt to use the 
assembly as a vehicle for self-promotion: see below pp.9-11. 
13 That is not to say that the individual’s pursuit of glory is not an issue in the assembly; the Homeric 
warrior not only must perform his deeds but also speak about them – be “a speaker of words and a doer of 
deeds” in Phoenix’s words (Iliad 9.443). But in their capacity as heroes, the characters enjoy a different (even 
destructive?) relationship with the laos, in the Iliad at least. Haubold (2000) 55-9 shows how the bond 
between leader and laos breaks down because Agamemnon addresses the group as heroes: with each man 
acting according to his own aspirations, they rush to the ships.  
14 Put most strongly by Strasburger (1997) 50: “The assembly of the army in the Iliad and the powerful 
assembly of the people in the Odyssey are mute assemblies, in which the crowd receives announcements and 
institutions” (my italics). R. Martin (1951) 20 more circumspectly understands the competing views in the 
assembly as showing “la toute-puissance du roi” or, on the contrary, “une puissance populaire”. 
15 Hammer (1998) 337: “The people, through the assembly, do not vote nor do they make binding 
decisions. But neither are they compliant, inert, absent, or silenced. We see decisions ‘enacted’ in a public 
space.” Cf. Hammer (2002) 44-8. 
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Analysing the assembly in this way has the advantage of approaching the subject 
of debate in a dynamic, not a static, way. This brings me to my fourth point: that we 
should pay attention to the performativity of the narrative, or the ways in which understanding debate is 
informed by experiencing it as a process. Let me sketch out what I mean by re-focussing the 
issue of Homeric debate. 
Recent studies focussing on the strife between Agamemnon and Achilles have 
come to conflicting interpretations about the political framework being represented. 
Donlan and Morris have argued that authority is first threatened then confirmed by 
Achilles’ conflict with Agamemnon.16 In contrast, Rose and Hammer have suggested that 
Agamemnon’s leadership is far less easy to put back together again after Achilles’ 
challenge to it.17 For Hammer, the Iliad presents not only a functioning social system, but 
a system in which we can see “competing values and orientations”. As a result, 
interpreting the Iliad is “not premised on the maintenance of a static, monolithic social 
order but…contains within it traces of conflict and dissent that, in the end, remain 
unresolved”.18 Rose also favours a dynamic, “relational” model to describe the internal 
struggle of the ruling class. But more suggestive to my mind are the terms with which he 
criticises Morris: 
                                                
16 Donlan (1979) usefully raises questions about who has authority and how you get it, but comes down on 
the side of Agamemnon. Morris (1986) reads debate in the light of an Iliad that is sensitive to elite reactions 
against a growing demotic consciousness. 
17 See esp. Hammer (2002) 82-92, 129-32. So too Taplin (1992) 6-7: “Issues… are open for dispute, both 
by characters within the poem, and by the audience outside. It is, indeed, vital to the quality of the poem 
that such matters are not closed.” For Taplin, this makes the Iliad a “highly political poem”. Cf. Osborne 
(1996) 150-5. 
18 Hammer (1997a) 341. 
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Morris seems to envision a short-circuited process of artistic production in which 
the consciousness of the main target audience, the demos, contributes no relevant 
feedback to the generation of the text.19    
Whether or not a demos was really the “main target audience” is a moot point; as Scodel 
has shown, by creating a shared past the Iliad helps foster a sense of inclusiveness 
amongst its listeners,20 which suggests the poem actively constructing an audience.21 But Rose’s 
emphasis on feedback raises an important counterpoint to the text generating meaning; 
that is, the role of the poem’s audience.22 
From his vantage point as a political theorist, Antony Giddens has contested the 
common understanding of institutions as “in some way grinding out ‘docile bodies’”. 
Instead, he understands structure as being “not ‘external’ to individuals”, but something 
experienced – and reproduced – by individuals working within that system.23 I believe 
that we might profit by analysing the assembly scenes in the Iliad in a similar way. What I 
argue is that “traces of conflict and dissent” are experienced by the audience of the poem in 
relation to a particular, institutional arena that is represented: the agora. To a degree this helps 
shape an agonistic response to these events; but, equally, the varying responses to each of 
                                                
19 Rose (1997) 167. 
20 Homeric epic is “the genre of social cohesion”: Scodel (2002) 182. Cf. Graziosi (2002) 171-80, 253-5. A 
shared past: Ford (1992) 6, 18; Scodel (2002) 88. 
21 Bakhtin (1981) 257: “Every literary work faces outward away from itself, towards the listener-reader, and 
to a certain extent this anticipates possible reactions to itself.” Cf. Todorov (1984) 54-6. 
22 Reader response theories make a similar claim by regarding reading as “an event”: Iser (1978[1976]) 127. 
They tend, though, to analyse the text detached from its social context. When Fish (1980) speaks of 
“interpretative communities” (14), he means by this strategies of reading that are in vogue in the academy. 
This has been criticised by Said (1983) 14f., who argues that reader response theory can lead to an 
essentially private, internalised event and, worse, a self-confirming authority within academic institutions. 
This caveat is particularly meaningful for those us who analyse texts that were publicly performed. 
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these crises involve the audience in realising the assembly as an institution that supports the challenging 
of authority and accommodates differences of opinion. 
The idea that dissent in the assembly is enacted and, to some extent, made 
institutional during the course of the Iliad may help us get away from the notion that the 
Iliad in some trivial sense presupposes a socio-political framework, or – which is a more 
sophisticated version of the same approach – challenges or questions such a framework. 
I suggest that the Iliad, by virtue of its varying representations of debate, places a 
responsibility on the audience to work through the scenes of assembly and realise its 
potential as a forum for managing dissent. 
The figure to whom we owe this is Achilles. It is Achilles who is the one agent 
willing and able to stand up to Agamemnon in the assembly that opens the epic. Yet his 
challenge precipitates an even greater crisis in Achaean community – his withdrawal. The 
two subsequent assemblies chart out a process of doing dissent without Achilles. Achilles 
returns for the final assembly; but, by continuing to resist attempts at control, he turns 
the debate onto the utility of debate itself and its place within the narrative strategy of the 
Iliad as a whole. 
 
I. On the tenth day Achilles called the people to an assembly: 
Setting the stage for debate 
 
The authoritative invocation to the muse ushers onto stage not one of Homer’s heroes 
but Chryses, a priest of Apollo, whose words of supplication to the king are – remarkably 
                                                                                                                                      
23 Giddens (1984) 14, 27. Cf. Bourdieu (1990[1980]) 130 on habitus. 
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– the first of the epic in direct speech.24 The reaction they provoke opens the Iliad’s 
narrative of conflict and dissent (1.22-4): 
e[nq j a[lloi me;n pavnte" ejpeufhvmhsan  jAcaioi; 
aijdei'sqai q j iJerh'a kai; ajglaa; devcqai a[poina: 
ajll j oujk  jAtrei?dh/  jAgamevmnoni h{ndane qumw'/. 
Then all the other Achaeans shouted assent to respect the priest and accept the glorious 
ransom; but it was not pleasing to the heart of Agamemnon, son of Atreus. 
The Achaeans acclaim Chryses’ supplication en masse, but Agamemnon takes it personally 
and, rounding on Chryses, sends him away in fear.25 The assertion of the king’s “mighty 
word” (kraterovn mu'qon, 1.25), however, is not the final word. Apollo obstructs the simple 
equation of speech and power with a plague on all their houses (1.44-52). In response, 
Achilles calls an assembly (1.54). The community in crisis sets the stage for the first 
assembly.26 And the community is in crisis because of a wilful assertion of authority. On 
the agenda of the first assembly then is the relationship between speech and power.27 In 
effect, it is what debate is all about. 
 
                                                
24 On Chryses: Redfield (1994[1975]) 94. On this scene in general: Scodel (2002) 65-89, 99-114. 
25 Griffin & Hammond (1998) 72 show how Agamemnon makes his assertion of authority personal by the 
emphatic use of the first-person pronoun. 
26 There is some doubt whether Chryses’ supplication takes place in an “assembly”. Ruzé (1997) includes it 
in her list of assemblies, though the term ajgorhv is not used. By swiftly taking us to a crisis point, the 
omission of any description of the assembly’s institutional frame has a clear dramatic function. But perhaps 
the meaning runs deeper: how is it that Agamemnon can send Chryses away? What might the lack of 
formal trappings imply? 
27 On the correspondence between the Chryses-Agamemnon / Agamemnon-Achilles scenes: Krischer 
(1971). 
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Take heart and speak: valorising the challenge to authority 
 
The problem of debate is immediately raised by the figure who, knowing past, future and 
present, ought to be able to benefit the community – Calchas, the seer. Invited to speak 
by Achilles, Calchas initially refrains from doing so out of fear of the man “who exercises 
power greatly over all” (o}}" mevga pavntwn  jArgeivwn kratevei, 1.78-9), “him whom the 
Achaeans obey” (oiJ peivqontai  jAcaioiv, 1.79). The middle voice of peivqw suggestively 
plays on ambiguity over whether the Achaeans are persuaded by or obey Agamemnon.28 
In turn, this question raises an issue that goes right to the heart of Agamemnon’s 
leadership and authority in general: do the community sanction his rule, on account of 
merit, or are they cowed by the power associated with him by virtue of the numerical 
superiority of his forces?29 Calchas leaves us in no doubt about his view: the Achaeans 
obey Agamemnon “for the king is stronger” (kreivsswn ga;r basileuv", 1.80). The opening 
gesture of this assembly sets power against speaking freely, obedience against persuasion. 
The possibility of speaking freely on behalf of the community is threatened by the 
authority of the king. 
We can see this in action as throughout the assembly Agamemnon attempts to 
control debate. He agrees with the tenor of Achilles’ demand that he must return his 
prize – but names and shames prominent individuals over whom he can exert his power 
(1.137-9). He pays lip-service to a third party’s plea for compromise – before launching 
on a tirade against his rival: “But this man is minded to be above all (pavntwn); over all 
                                                
28 Hammer (1997b) deconstructs Agamemnon’s leadership using Achilles’ question: “How shall any of the 
Achaeans readily obey you?” (1.150). Cf. Hammer (2002) 82-92. 
29 Agamemnon’s detractors: Taplin (1990), (1992); Alvis (1995) 21; Rose (1997); Hammer (1997b), (2002). 
His defenders: Morris (1986); McGlew (1989). The scholia are a good example of how later readers in a 
different institutional context have tried to salvage Agamemnon’s status and reputation: Murray (1965). 
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(pavntwn) he wishes to hold sway and to be king over all (pavntessi) and to instruct all 
(pa'si)” (1.287-91). An important issue is raised here: Agamemnon seeks to hold on to 
power, but the extravagance of his language, which displays excess in every which way, 
suggests otherwise. He loses his grip entirely as, uniquely in epic, he is interrupted and 
Achilles gets the last word. Even as Agamemnon grabs at power, authority slips from his 
grasp. 
Indeed, he spectacularly fails to silence opposition. His demand for recompense 
from the group (leuvssete ga;r tov ge pavnte", 1.120) opens up another site of contention, 
Achilles’ jibe against him as the “most profit-loving of all” (filokteanwvtate pavntwn, 122). 
His personal threat against Achilles provokes Achilles’ individual response: fine, I’ll go 
home (1.169-71). Most revealing of all is his initial entry into the debate (1.106-7, 112-4): 
mavnti kakw'n, ouj pwv potev moi to; krhvguon ei\pa": 
aijeiv toi ta; kavk j ejsti; fivla fresi; manteuvesqai... 
             ... polu; bouvlomai aujth;n 
oi[koi e[cein. kai; gavr rJa Klutaimnhvstrh" probevboula, 
kouridivh" ajlovcou...       
Seer of evil, never yet have you said to me something agreeable, but always evil things are 
dear to your heart to prophesy… I really wanted to have her [Briseis] at home. For, let me 
tell you, I think more of her than Clytaemnestra my wedded wife… 
Agamemnon’s abuse of the seer appears somewhat over-the-top as a response to the 
revelation of the plague’s cause. But behind his address of Calchas as “seer of evil” and 
the temporal indicators “never”, “always” the poem’s audience might be tempted to 
recall different contexts, other tales – namely Aulis where Agamemnon sacrificed his 
daughter to launch the ships following Calchas’s prophecy to the letter. Scodel has 
recently argued that “the tradition” has to be established in the process of performance.30 
                                                
30 It is not, as scholars often assume, simply a collection of reified reminisces: Scodel (2002) esp. 1-41. 
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Nevertheless, she implies a degree of control over the production of allusion that, in this 
case at least, seems unwarranted. In fact, at stake here is precisely the lack of control 
exerted over the narrative by Agamemnon.31 By having him label Calchas as the seer who 
has “always” prophesied him evil (the sacrifice of Iphigeneia?), and then by having him 
rank his concubine (a Cassandra?) above his wife Clytemnestra, the Iliad invites its 
audience to imagine events in which Agamemnon’s authority – even life! – are seriously 
compromised. His loss of command over the telling of the tale signalled by these 
ominous echoes of traditions, whose relevance to the present tale must be assessed by 
each and every spectator, implicates the audience in the resistance movement. Dissent 
from Agamemnon is underscored by the narrative, which threatens to fracture and 
unwind in directions contrary to what the “king who exercises power greatly over all” 
had intended. 
The conditions for challenging authority had been set by Achilles. It is not 
immediately apparent why Hera should turn to him to assemble the Achaeans, only that 
action is required to find a solution to Apollo’s wrath. It is essential to note, then, that 
the first assembly is expressly convoked for the benefit of the community.32 In fact, in his 
                                                
31 Referring to this example, Scodel (2002) 106 comments: “The poet probably had the sacrifice in mind as 
he generated angry words for Agamemnon, but the audience need not follow the allusion.” Indeed not; but 
the audience are clearly invited to follow it: Dowden (1996) 58. Nor do I follow Scodel’s assertion that the 
audience “should not” remember the story since that would create too much sympathy for Agamemnon; 
sympathy is not difficult to withhold from Agamemnon given the violence of his language. 
32 Emphasised by Taplin (1992) 63. 
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resistance to Agamemnon’s attempts to pull rank, Achilles couches his argument in 
exactly these terms.33 
Nevertheless, Achilles is a unique individual, whose speech is endowed with a 
special power.34 The proem hints at things to come by setting Agamemnon “lord of 
men” against “divine-like Achilles” ( jAtrei?dh" te a[nax ajndrw'n kai; di'o"  jAcilleuv", 1.7): 
whereas Agamemnon is defined in terms of his social relationships, the epithet 
identifying Achilles hints at his divine origins. When the seer Calchas explains to the 
assembly that he knows what is wrong but fears saying it, it is Achilles who speaks up 
(1.85, 88-90): 
qarshvsa" mavla eijpe; qeoprovpion o{ ti oi\sqa: 
... ou[ ti" ejmeu' zw'nto" kai; ejpi; cqoni; derkomevnoio 
soi;; koivlh/" para; nhusi; bareiva" cei'ra" ejpoivsei 
sumpavntwn Danaw'n, oujd j h]n  jAgamevmnona ei[ph/". 
Take heart and speak whatever prophecy you know… Not any one of all the Danaans 
shall lay heavy hands on you beside the hollow ships, while I am alive and looking on the 
earth, not even if you mean Agamemnon. 
It is Achilles who sponsors the assembly as the place where opinions should be freely 
given and freely heard, even if those views challenge the king. 
 It is important to bear in mind both Achilles’ defence of the right to speak and 
his divine connection when interpreting this assembly. For, by its end, Achilles has 
asserted his individual will and in doing so cursed the community he had claimed to 
                                                
33 Gernet (1955) 15 points out how Achilles connects his personal “prize” (gevra") to the “what lay in 
common” (xunhvi>a keivmena, 1.124). Cf. Alvis (1995) 21. Donlan (1979) 58 makes the case that Achilles’ 
“leadership authority” is grounded in his relationship to the group. 
34 His language is full of superlatives, he uses multiple numbers to emphasise his argument, he coins 
neologisms: Griffin (1986); R. P. Martin (1989) 147-9, 171, 185.  
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support. His withdrawal to his tent dominates the poem thematically and structurally.35 
The narrator’s description of how Achilles and Agamemnon “stood apart fighting with 
violent words” (w}" twv g j ajntibivoisi macessamevnw ejpevessin/ ajnsthvthn, 304-5) is to the 
point.36 It appears, then, that this first assembly has simply replaced one crisis with 
another. Strife (eris) has not been kept within the institution. To explore how dissent has 
gone wrong – even when it had been necessary – and what we might surmise about that, 
I turn to the two interventions in the debate. 
 
& there came Athena: mediating conflict 
 
The one Achaean to intercede in the struggle of words is described in glowing terms by 
the narrator: Nestor is the “clear-voiced orator”, from whose tongue “flowed speech 
sweeter than honey”, who had seen “two generations of men pass”.37 The speech that 
flows forth justifies such a description: invoking a past paradigm, he invites the two 
warring parties to draw the lesson from it; addressing each according to a subtle 
distinction of status – Achilles is karterov" (280), Agamemnon fevrtero" (281) – he 
accommodates different readings38 and, thus, creates an opportunity for negotiation.  
                                                
35 Hammer (1997a), discussing Achilles as a metanastês, a position that “gives him (at least in his mind) a 
privileged perspective of the artifice of Achaean society” (353), regards Achilles’ dissent as showing not so 
much an “anti-cultural” strain as “the value of non-coerciveness” (355). Cf. Hammer (2002) 94ff. As I see 
it, Achilles’ dissent is very much cultural in a context that struggles to make use of it. 
36 The next time the assembly is described it is as the place where “men win glory” (ajgorh; kudiavneira, 
1.490); kudiavneiraotherwise appears only with mavch (4.225, 6.124, 7.113, 8.448, 12.325, 13.270, 14.155, 
24.391). Cramer (1976) 300 calls the single use either “tendentious” or else “creative incompetence”. 
37 The description echoes the portrait of the good king at Hesiod Th., 82-90, 96-7.  
38 Including assessing his role. Though Nestor speaks measuredly, he favours Agamemnon’s authority by 
deploying Agamemnon’s own description of himself as fevrtero" (1.186) and Achilles as karterov" (1.178): 
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Yet, for all his persuasiveness, the speech fails; neither figure shows any 
willingness to compromise and the assembly abruptly breaks up. Nestor’s intervention 
has shown the desirability of mediation; but the fact that it fails defers providing any 
answer to the crisis. Both aspects combine to implicate in the debate over mediation the 
poem’s audience, who are left, like Nestor, to pick up the skeptron and work out a 
position in between those staked out on either side. The fact that the skeptron – the 
symbol of the right to speak in public39  – lies on the ground, moreover suggests that 
Nestor’s intervention comes too late.40 Divine intervention has already moved the 
conflict on and beyond.  
 At line 194, as Achilles reaches for his sword with the aim of bringing the debate 
to a swift and decisive end (Agamemnon’s, he hopes!), Athena appears.41 As scholarship 
on this epiphany testifies, her intervention, far from resolving the crisis, challenges 
interpretation and stresses human responsibility in making judgement.42 Erbse suggests 
                                                                                                                                      
Reinhardt (1961) 74n.15. See pp. 29-30 below. The narrator complicates matters still further by describing 
Achilles as “by far the mightiest” (polu; fevrtato", 2.769) in the catalogue of the ships. 
39 The skeptron: Reinhardt (1991[1961]) 159-60; Lynn-George (1988) 47-9; Easterling (1989). Ruzé (1997) 
52 asserts that: “La parole qu’ils prononcent avec le sceptre ne souffrira pas la contradiction ou alors le 
sceptre lui-même sera mis en action pour rappeler à l’ordre l’outrecuidant.” Along similar lines, Mondi 
(1980) argues that the skeptron is the symbol of royal privilege. But see Detienne (1996[1967]) 95: taking 
hold of the skeptron confers on the individual the right to speak. It is an “impersonal” act, representing the 
sovereignty of the group. Cf. Gernet (1981[1968]) 188. 
40 The untimeliness of human intervention: Lynn-George (1988) 163-4, 168-9, 172-3, 272-6. 
41 The suddenness of her arrival: M. Edwards (1987) 180-1. Cf. Reinhardt (1961) 68-73. 
42 A favourite case for scholars wishing to comment on “Homeric” man: Dodds (1951) 14-15 sees 
Athena’s intervention as an outward projection of Achilles’ inner self; Snell (1982[1949]) 30-4 denies 
Homeric man a sense of self; cf. Williams (1993) 21-6 for a critique. I have learnt much about telling divine 
presence from Alex Stevens (2002). 
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that Athena has to intervene since none of the other kings could.43 At first sight this 
would seem to neglect Nestor, who, as we have seen, makes the attempt; but Erbse is 
right, I believe, in the sense that there is at this point no human means for accommodating 
Achilles’ dissent in the institution of assembly, regardless of how greatly he had been 
motivated to speak on behalf of the community.  
 This raises four issues fundamental to the rest of my enquiry. First, Athena’s 
intervention marks a limit to dissent in the assembly. Her hold on Achilles’ hair does not 
in any way suggest that his resistance to Agamemnon is wrong.44 Nor can it, however, be 
allowed to transgress into naked force. The potential violence of an Achilles needs to be 
excluded as a socially acceptable reaction in debate.45 This provides an authorising of, but 
equally a careful bounding to, dissent. Dissent cannot, and does not, equal violence.  
 Second, it identifies the individual who had convoked the assembly, Achilles, as a 
problem in it. Athena compensates Achilles for not drawing his sword with the 
possibility of greater license in his verbal assault.46 It is this license that renders Nestor’s 
intervention futile before the act. Similarly, when Achilles with his last words in the 
assembly promises an immediate and demonstrative end to contest,47 he has already 
sworn an oath that his mother, Thetis, will take up to Olympus. In this way, Achilles’ 
challenge demonstratively exceeds the frame of this assembly. 
                                                
43 Erbse (1986) 138f. 
44 On the contrary, Achilles’ labelling of Agamemnon’s behaviour as hubris (1.203) is endorsed by Athena 
(1.214). This kind of verbal collusion between a mortal and a divinity is highly unusual. I thank the 
anonymous PCPS referee for drawing this to my attention. Cf. Griffin (1986) 52. 
45 A contest of words leading to combat is not debate but flyting, which is more appropriate to the 
battlefield: Parks (1986), (1990); R. P. Martin (1989) 65-77. 
46 Lynn-George (1988) 45-6. For Achilles’ dissent (after Athena’s intervention) as blame: Nagy (1979) 226; 
cf. 35n.5. 
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 Following on from this, I suggest that the assembly does not start off as an 
institution that can easily accommodate dissent. It takes an Achilles, by virtue of his 
unique status, to set up an assembly and then support a voice in opposition to the 
affirmed authority. The next two Achaean assemblies pursue this beginning by exploring 
how dissent may be managed within the institutional framework – but they occur 
without Achilles. Having prepared the ground for supporting communal debate, he finds 
himself excluded from it. Far from providing the answer, Achilles becomes part of the 
problem with his assertion of individuality. It opens a space into which the poem’s 
audience are invited to enter and work out what they think about debate. 
 Lastly, this suggests a way of looking at the Iliad in broader, more cosmic, terms. 
To explain, I consider more precisely how Athena’s intervention is represented. Athena 
appears at the behest of Hera, who holds dear (filei'n) both Achilles and Agamemnon.48 
As we noted above, Athena in effect divorces dissent from violence, and to that extent 
validates it as a mode of political interaction. On the other hand, this is achieved not 
through any already existent public arena (such as an assembly), but rather through a 
personal bond of philia, a special relationship between god and mortal. Perhaps what is 
wrong then with Achilles’ initial dissent is that its containment can be guaranteed only at 
the level of personal relations, and not through this public institution – yet. This 
assembly is a first – which explains why the issue of speech and power is so central to it 
and why Achilles’ challenge is so problematic. To all intents and purposes, before 
Achilles calls an assembly, the Achaeans simply did not possess the capacity to discuss 
                                                                                                                                      
47 “Try me so that these here may recognise who is best” (peivrhsai i{na gnwvwsi kai; oi{de, 1.302). 
48 a[mfw oJmw'" qumw'/ filevousav te khdomevnh te (1.209). 
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public concerns in the open. Now an assembly has been established, the audience are to 
learn what that means as they experience the event of assembly in the narrative.49  
 
The opening assembly sets the stage for an exploration of dissent in the rest of the epic. 
It is by no means clear, after the eris between Agamemnon and Achilles, whether dissent 
is or can be institutional; Achilles challenges the authority of Agamemnon on behalf of 
the community for the good of the community, but ends up asserting his uniqueness 
over it. In the two assembly scenes that follow, the Achaean community respond by 
working through the possibilities for debate: who can dissent, and in what ways can you 
dissent properly? 
 
II. Responding to Achilles: making dissent institutional 
 
By the time we see Achilles again two other Achaean assemblies have taken place 
forming differing kinds of responses to his challenge. In the first, a necessary human 
limit is placed on dissent by the violent suppression of a man who is excluded from 
being able to speak by virtue of his status. In the second, an Achilles-like figure takes up 
the fight with Agamemnon though, on this occasion, in a more constructive way. Left at 
that, this would show the Iliad’s interest in valorising dissent. I suggest, however, that the 
                                                
49 The anonymous PCPS reviewer objected here that one “can’t really speak, for instance, of the first 
assembly in the poem as the first assembly experienced by the audience when it is so clear – and embedded 
in the formulae – that the procedures and experiences of the assembly pre-exist the Iliad”. I entirely agree – 
but I find it significant, regarding this first assembly, that: a) formula is kept to the bare minimum 
(“Achilles calls an assembly”); b) Hera puts the idea into Achilles’ mind. (Similarly, if we consider Chryses’ 
supplication, indications of an institution are entirely absent.) I do not mean to imply that “in reality” no 
one had ever heard anything like this before; rather that the Iliad presents it as such. 
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text goes further, by virtue of involving its audience in the process of thinking through 
what dissent means. 
 
The most shameful: framing Thersites 
 
Having plunged the Achaean camp into strife, the narrative soon appears to get back on 
track for a tale of Troy’s sack. The king convokes a second assembly, a voice of 
opposition is silenced, and two wise advisors prepare for the mustering of the troops.50 
Yet, how we get there is rather more complex.51 I analyse first how Agamemnon seeks to 
reaffirm his authority; secondly, how the narrator frames Thersites’ speech. I will show 
how this assembly scene may be understood as continuing to explore the boundaries of 
debate and to implicate the audience of the poem more explicitly in setting those 
boundaries themselves. 
Agamemnon formally convokes the second assembly. In some detail the 
narrative describes the people gathering. Under such institutional management, 
expectations are raised of a rousing speech before battle. Nothing of the sort occurs 
however (2.50-3): 
aujta;r oJ khruvkessi ligufqovggoisi kevleuse 
khruvssein ajgorhvnde kavrh komovwnta"  jAcaiouv": 
oiJ me;n ejkhvrusson, toi; d j hjgeivronto mavl j w\ka. 
boulh;n de; prw'ton megaquvmwn i|ze gerovntwn...  
                                                
50 The assembly of book two as restoring order and reasserting the kings’ dominance: Donlan (1979) 60-1; 
Lincoln (1994) 34. The critics queuing up to condemn Thersites is well documented in Rankin (1972) and 
Rose (1988). Scodel (2002) 209 discusses how Odysseus and Nestor “use strikingly inclusive language” to 
reunify the group in preparation for the catalogue of the ships. 
51 For problems in book two in general: Reinhardt (1991[1961]) 107ff. 
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But Agamemnon ordered the clear-voiced heralds to gather the long-haired Achaeans to an 
assembly. And they gave the summons, and the people gathered quickly. But first 
[Agamemnon] sat down a council of great-hearted elders… 
The heralds heralded, the people gather really swiftly, but first… The elaborate portrayal 
of public gathering breaks off, suddenly, as Agamemnon calls a council. Significantly, this 
is the only time that the council (boulhv) is introduced without the ritual formula “when 
their desire for food and drink had been put away”.52 After this unanticipated break, 
when we return to the assembling we discover that “divine Rumour” has wrested control 
from Agamemnon’s heralds (2.93-4), who are struggling to maintain order in the face of 
the multiplication of views. In spite of the formulaic beginning, this assembly seems 
unduly chaotic and the instituting individual – in this case Agamemnon – appears to have 
lost control of it. We recall that Agamemnon had convoked the assembly on the basis of 
a lying dream. Authority is still a question.53 
This already unstable frame is compromised still further by another surprise: 
Agamemnon not only relates his dream to the council but introduces the plan – not 
prefigured by the narrator – to “test” the army (2.73-5).54 Commentators are much 
troubled by such narrative dislocations: 
                                                
52 Using boulhv with the formulaic phrase aujta;r ejpei; povsio" kai; ejdhtuvo" ejx e[ron e{nto gives three councils: 
2.432, 7.323, 9.92. Cf. Mackie (1996) 21-23; Carlier (1996) 8f.; Ruzé (1997) 31ff.; Hölkeskamp (1998) 19. 
Donlan (1979) 65 mentions in passing that the formulas of boulhv and ajgorhv suggest a structural deep-
rootedness of group authority. See also Schofield (1999) esp. 21-30. 
53 Rumour as a corrosive discourse and a speech-act not sanctioned by the community: Lincoln (1994) 78-
79. Thalmann (1988) 7 identifies the dream as one feature that problematises the legitimacy of 
Agamemnon’s authority. 
54 For bibliography on Agamemnon’s test see Knox & Russo (1989) 351n.2, to which may be added: 
McGlew (1989) (sympathetic); Haubold (2000) 54-9 (not). On Agamemnon’s assertion that it is the custom 
(h} qevmi" ejstin, 2.73), see Reinhardt (1991[1961]) 159, who asks “Wieso? Weshalb?” 
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Behind the paradoxes and confusions of the testing motif in its present 
form one is probably right to detect other versions, in the earlier traditions 
or in the monumental poet’s own repertoire.55 
The usual suspects: other versions, earlier traditions, recent insertions. But commentary is 
needed. What we can say is that the frame displaces an authoritative telling. Possibilities 
of dissent extend to the interpretation of what is going on.  
Agamemnon’s speech provides a good example of this. First, Agamemnon tests 
the army in the unshakeable belief that he will take Troy that day. He’s far wide of the 
mark, however: not only has Zeus deceived him with a lying dream, but his hopes are 
expressly set in opposition to what the tale will tell. The Iliad is not going to fulfil his 
desire that Troy will fall “that very day”. Agamemnon’s authority is challenged by the 
narrative direction of the Iliad itself.56  
Second, there is the issue of the test itself. Zeus “counselled evil deception” 
(kakh;n ajpavthn bouleuvsato, 2.114), Agamemnon says, hoping to deceive the assembled 
group that he has given up on the war. Of course, it is Agamemnon who has been 
deceived by Zeus, who truly has “counselled evil deception”. And Agamemnon fails. Or, 
does he succeed rather too well? After all, the army are so taken in that they rush to the 
ships. This is a speech from which the embedded audience are supposed to dissent, but 
they don’t. As a result, when it comes to the staging of authority, when Odysseus beats 
                                                
55 Kirk (1985) 124-5n.86. Leaf (1960[1886-8]) 47: “How then are we to explain this wonderful medley of 
inconsistent and self-contradictory motives? The conclusion seems inevitable that we have a fusion of two 
quite different continuations of the first book.” 
56 Scodel (2002) 210 describes Agamemnon’s dream as creating “an ironic distance between characters and 
audience”. Though she shows how Odysseus and Nestor unite characters and audience with the goal of 
taking Troy, she underestimates, I feel, the lasting distance between what Agamemnon hopes – and 
Odysseus and Nestor argue for – and the tale the Iliad will tell. Cf. Haubold (2000) 59. 
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up Thersites, the poem’s audience are already on less than sure footing. Are we going to 
get it right? 
 The army rush to the ships. Odysseus gets them back in line with persuasion and 
coercion.57 Even then, when order (noisily, 2.209) returns, the tale takes another 
unexpected turn: enter Thersites. 
The strain on the narrative in allowing a voice from below to be heard on the 
epic stage is manifested by the fact that the character introduction is the most detailed 
and evaluative of its kind (2.212-19): 
Qersivth" d j e[ti mou'no" ajmetroeph;" ejkolwv/a, 
o}" e[pea fresi; h|/sin a[kosmav te pollav te h[/dh, 
mavy, ajta;r ouj kata; kovsmon, ejrizevmenai basileu'sin, 
ajll j o{ ti oiJ ei[saito geloivi>on  jArgeivoisin 
e[mmenai: ai[scisto" de; ajnh;r uJpo;  [Ilion h\lqe: 
folko;" e[hn, cwlo;" d j e{teron povda: tw; dev oiJ w[mw 
kurtwv, ejpi; sth'qo" sunocwkovte: aujta;r u{perqe 
foxo;" e[hn kefalhvn, yednh; d j ejpenhvnoqe lavcnh. 
Thersites of measureless speech alone kept chattering, who knew many disorderly words in 
his mind, idly not with due order to cause strife with the kings, but whatever he thought 
would be funny for the Argives. He was the most shameful of men that came to Ilios: he 
was bandy-legged and lame in one foot, his shoulders were humped, stooping together over 
his chest, and above them his head was warped, and little hair grew on top. 
                                                
57 Against the view that this simply represents a reassertion of authority, Hammer (2002) 88: “[I]n restoring 
order, Odysseus does not necessarily restore Agamemnon’s power. For what holds the political field 
together now is not people acting together, but force.” Odysseus’s call for there to be “one king” (ei|" 
koivrano" e[stw, 2.204) as he “plays the role of being king” (koiranevwn, 2.207) could have an edge: Thalmann 
(1988) 12. 
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As Lincoln comments: “Before we are permitted to hear what he says… the text is at 
pains to describe him in such a way as to emphasise his anomalous nature, deformed 
appearance, and to shape the attitude we will adopt toward him.”58 The narrator’s entry 
into the debate to describe Thersites’ appearance forms our response to Thersites. But just 
what is at stake in Thersites’ deformation comes to light in the lines that follow (2.220-4): 
e[cqisto" d j  jAcilh'i> mavlist j h\n hjd j  jOdush'i>: 
tw; ga;r neikeiveske: tovt j au\t j  jAgamevmnoni divw/ 
ojxeva keklhvgwn levg j ojneivdea: tw'/ d j a[r j  jAcaioi; 
ejkpavglw" kotevonto nemevsshqevn t j ejni; qumw'/. 
aujta;r oJ makra; bow'n  jAgamevmnona neivkee muvqw/:  
Most hateful he was to Achilles above all and to Odysseus, for he would abuse the pair of 
them. At that time with shrill cries he again abused against divine Agamemnon. With 
him the Achaeans were exceedingly angry and had indignation in their hearts. But he 
shouting loud abused Agamemnon with a speech.  
The audience must make some tough choices here. How are we to take the dative 
pronoun tw'/? How adversative is the “but” (aujtavr) which precedes the nominative 
pronoun oJ? Do both refer to Thersites, to stress his isolation?59 (Thus: “The Achaeans 
were angry with Thersites. In spite of this he abused Agamemnon.”) Or does the first 
pronoun mark out Agamemnon as the object of malcontent, the second Thersites as the 
one figure who dares voice the rank-and-file’s complaints?60 (“The Achaeans were (all) 
angry with Agamemnon. But it was Thersites…”) The choice rather depends on what we 
think that the Iliad is doing. What position we opt for depends on what position we 
                                                
58 Lincoln (1994) 21 (my italics). 
59 Kouklanakis (1999) 49: “[T]he voice of dissent is given a brief, but substantial, space to be expressed, 
only to be cast in the most negative light, that is, as the product of a lonely and freakish mind.” Cf. Kirk 
(1985) 140n.220-3. 
60 Postlethwaite (1998[1988]). Cf. Leaf (1960[1886-8]) 65n.222. 
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adopt for ourselves. At the moment when the narrator enters the debate, the audience 
are asked to make a judgement.61 
As it is, we are not given an opportunity to witness dissent from – or with – 
Thersites; embedded audience reaction is deferred until after Odysseus has spoken and 
beaten him up. Then the narrator comments (2.270-4): 
oiJ de; kai; ajcnuvmenoiv per ejp j aujtw'/ hJdu; gevlassan: 
w|de dev ti" ei[pesken ijdw;n ej" plhsivon a[llon: 
w] povpoi, h\ dh; muriv j  jOdusseu;" ejsqla; e[orge 
boulav" t j ejxavrcwn ajgaqa;" povlemovn te koruvsswn: 
nu'n de; tovde mevg j a[riston ejn  jArgeivoisin e[rexen... 
But [the Achaeans], though they were pained, laughed sweetly at [Thersites]. And thus 
would one speak looking at his neighbour: “Well, well, Odysseus has done many noble 
deeds in leading good counsel and conducting war; but now this here thing is by far the best 
he has done among the Argives…” 
The internal audience together laugh and draw the lesson.62 But critical response has been 
far less univocal, invited by the disjunction between the group’s gang laughter and the 
narrator’s – startling – insight into their mind-set: “though they were pained”.63 For 
Nagy, laughter comes at the expense of the blame poet.64 For Detienne, “Odysseus’ 
treatment of Thersites, the epitome of the man of the demos, reflects the limits of 
                                                
61 Scodel (2002), finding the ambiguity frustrating (“Unfortunately, the lines that describe the emotional state 
of the Achaean audience are difficult”), enters the scene to cast her own judgment: “It is far likelier that the 
army is angry with Thersites” (205, my italics). 
62 Verbalised in the form of a “someone” (tis) speech, a communal voice: de Jong (1987) 82. Cf. 
Richardson (1990) 82, with 224n.28. 
63 Postlethwaite (1998[1988]) 93 analyses this ambiguity in the light of the narrator’s introduction. Cf. 
Rankin (1972) 43n.25; Rose (1988) 20. 
64 Nagy (1979) 260-3. Cf. Lowry (1991). 
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egalitarian speech.”65 Rose provocatively suggests that the joke is in fact on Odysseus: 
beating up this miserable wretch is, apparently, “his best deed yet”!66 
Perhaps this situation represents an altogether more serious moment. Haft 
observes the prominence of Odysseus and Odyssean echoes in this book, significantly 
just after Achilles has removed himself from the scene. 67  It is as if Odysseus threatens to 
take control of this, his rival’s, narrative. What is more, in Proclus’s summary of the 
Cypria, it was Achilles who prevented the disgraceful flight to the ships. Here Odysseus 
usurps that role in the wake of Achilles’ withdrawal from the action. The fall-out from 
Achilles’ act of dissent extends to opening up his epic narrative to his rival.68  
 Why we laugh becomes a question. Responding to the violent suppression of 
dissent, scholars tend to betray their own ideological positions.69 Laughter opens us up to 
criticism even as we are invited to sanction the reassertion of authority. Is the joke on us?  
Joking apart, this is deadly serious. Thalmann suggests that laughter co-opts the 
on-lookers back into the hierarchy.70 I propose that this potentially includes the audience 
                                                
65 Detienne (1996) 103. Cf. Lincoln (1994) 26. 
66 Rose (1988) 21.  
67 Haft (1990), (1992). She, however, sees the relationship between the two epics as complementary not 
agonistic. Seibel (1995) goes further and identifies Thersites as Odysseus’s “alter ego” (386), a connection 
taken up by later literature; in Sophocles’ Philoctetes, Thersites is cited with Odysseus as a spin merchant 
(438-42). 
68 In suggesting a rivalry, I do not imply primacy of one text over the other; I mean rather to suggest that 
the Homeric poems may be considered as representative of competing traditions, the one privileging 
Achilles, the other Odysseus, and that a tension between the two surfaces here. See further the final 
assembly, pp. 31-8 below. 
69 Rose (1988) 10-11: “For those who view the Thersites passage as evidence of the poet’s ideology there is 
almost an irresistible temptation to stand up and be counted for or against.” 
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of the poem – which is important if we consider that Thersites’ dissent is closely 
modelled on Achilles’.71 Is there a danger, therefore, that we trivialise Achilles’ challenge 
to Agamemnon? In this context it is worth reconsidering the opening frame: Thersites 
“reviled the kings, recklessly and in no due order, but whatever he thought would raise a laugh” 
(ajll j o{ tiv oiJ ei[saito geloivi>on  jArgeivoisin / e[mmenai, 2.215-16). Is one problem with 
Thersites the fact that he is only interested in parody and that, as a result, we may fail to 
take dissent seriously? Are we in danger of missing the significance of what Achilles had 
done for us by calling that first assembly? No wonder tradition has it that Achilles killed 
Thersites…72 
 
Odysseus’s beating up of Thersites draws attention to the exercise of authority which, 
paradoxically, opens it up to analysis. Even as it suppresses a voice of dissent, the Iliad 
makes us aware that it implicates us into this act. As Rose remarks: “It is impossible to 
attempt to ‘manipulate’ or ‘manage’ a serious discontent without somehow reminding the 
audience of the grounds for that discontent – without therefore running the risk of 
                                                                                                                                      
70 Through laughter the audience adopt the language and values of their betters, “such are the complex 
dynamics of their laughter as it brings them back to submission:” Thalmann (1988) 21. 
71 Whitman (1958) 161. Cf. Postlethwaite (1998[1988]), who analyses the speech as a rehearsal of and 
commentary upon the quarrel; Reinhardt (1991[1961]) 162, who calls the scene a “Nachspiel” on the book 
one assembly; Schadewaldt (1987[1966]) 152, with n.2, who labels Thersites’ speech a “Zerrspiegel” of 
Achilles’ anger. Rose (1988) 19 questions those critics who condemn Thersites’ speech as a disorderly 
aberration when it seems so closely modelled on Achilles’ complaints. 
72 The Aethiopis – judging by Proclus’s summary – showed Thersites in a rather different light “as a bona fide 
satirist, i.e., one who displays an attitude of comic self-righteousness endorsed by the narrative in which it is 
embedded”: Rosen (2003) 123. The difference, according to Rosen, is in the performance context: “stasis 
arose over the death of Thersites” (Chrestomathia p.105.25 OCT) because he was killed at a feast, whereas 
here he is beaten out of the assembly. Epic dissent does not equal comic abuse (134). 
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heightening the very discontent one intends to contain and co-opt.”73 We might go 
further and say that, even as the Iliad sets out boundaries to dissent, it does so in a way 
that involves its audience in thinking about it and in setting down those boundaries 
themselves. In this way, we are involved in managing dissent. And, in doing so, we begin 
to realise the potential of the assembly as an institution that valorises dissent. 
 
To fight with words is the custom: institutionalising dissent 
 
The next Achaean assembly opens as if it is going to replay the events of book two. We 
again see Agamemnon convoking the assembly to raise the spectre of return, only this 
time he is in deadly earnest.74 Different too is the response. On this occasion, 
Agamemnon’s proposal of flight provokes a fierce rejoinder by Diomedes, in terms that 
significantly emphasise his right to speak in the assembly (9.32-3): 
jAtrei?dh, soi; prw'ta machvsomai ajfradevonti: 
h} qevmi" ejstivn, a[nax, ajgorh'/: su; de; mhv ti colwqh'/". 
Son of Atreus, first with you I’ll fight since you’ve lost your wits; it’s the custom, lord, in 
the assembly. And you, don’t get angry.  
Diomedes not only flags his disagreement with Agamemnon. He also self-consciously 
locates his act in the precedent established by Achilles.75 The end of that first assembly 
had concluded with the two speakers “fighting with words” (1.304). The verbal echo 
                                                
73 Rose (1988) 13. Or Lincoln (1994) 6: “In a state of latency or occultation, persuasion and coercion alike 
are constitutive points of authority, but once actuated and rendered explicit they signal – indeed they are, at 
least temporarily – its negation.” 
74 Lynn-George (1988) 81ff.; Hammer (2002) 89. 
75 Diomedes as a second Achilles: Griffin (1983[1980]) 74f.; Schofield (1999) 29. Lohmann (1970) calls this 
scene “Die Spielgelung zur Streitszene im ersten Buch” (217), and specifically identifies Diomedes as 
playing the role of Achilles’ “double” (221). 
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draws on the authority of Achilles’ opposition in book one. But Diomedes’ assertion 
goes one step further: “it is the custom” (h} qevmi" ejstivn), he says. John Foley glosses the 
expression used here as follows: 
The Assembly seems institutionally a place where disagreement, perhaps for 
the sake of entertaining all factions and all possibilities, is allowed without 
fear of personal reprisal.76 
Such a description appears apt for our study; but it should not be overlooked that a 
character speaks these lines. According to Griffin, the phrase “it is the custom” is only 
ever used by characters: “the poet never commits himself to expressing, from his own 
mouth, the idea that something is correct, in line with timeless usage.”77 
What I suggest is that Diomedes applies the phrase to provide for himself the 
authorisation to speak in opposition. That is to say, he is being not merely descriptive but 
prescriptive. The assembly does not simply exist as the place where disagreement is 
allowed; Diomedes makes it thus in his opening salvo and sanctions it as the place where 
contesting with the king is not only possible but essential.78 We might say he 
institutionalises dissent. By the time we get to book nine, the assembly can indeed be 
legitimately regarded as “institutionally a place where disagreement is allowed”. We no 
longer need an Achilles to answer Agamemnon. 
                                                
76 J. Foley (1991) 175n.79 (my italics). 
77 Griffin (1986) 38. Hammer (2002) 89-90, 115-34, recognising the need to examine themis in “context of 
the enactment of relationships within the epic”, sees its invocation “not as the incoherence of custom or 
oral culture, but as an aspect of regularization in which themis is stated as a public claim” (127). However, 
he locates the change in the understanding of political space in the character (Diomedes) and not the 
poem’s audience (132-3). 
78 Schofield (1986) 14 glosses the importance of this speech by drawing a connection to the prowess 
shown in battle. 
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The use of an institutional framework is taken up more explicitly in the scene that 
follows. Nestor intervenes with the proposal that the whole army should go off to take 
their meal (dovrpa t j ejfoplisovmesqa, 9.66) while the leaders take counsel (boulh;n 
bouleuvsh/, 9.75). By connecting the taking of a meal to deliberation, Nestor formally 
glosses the formula “once they had put away their appetite” (9.92) that precedes every 
Achaean council.79 In this council, Nestor’s more direct criticism of Agamemnon, 
especially his appeal that Agamemnon should act for the common good, demonstrates 
the utility of this more intimate gathering.80 The description of the kings meeting for a 
meal provides an explicit institutional frame of reference for the discussion that follows. 
Under Nestor’s supervision the text shows the Achaean community managing 
dissent within an institutional framework.81 In the context of book nine, indeed, both 
assembly and council are vital to the health of the community and to the telling of the 
tale. Had it been left to the “lord of men” Agamemnon, the Achaeans would be 
returning home and we would be on a nostos narrative. Instead, the careful framing of 
dissent offers an escape from the predicament that the leader had precipitated and, with 
equal importance, it allows the narrative of the Iliad to be told: we remain at Troy to 
negotiate (with) Achilles. Dissent is being made integral both to the well-being of the 
                                                
79 See n.51 above. For the understanding of the belly (gasthvr) as the enemy of good deliberation see 
Hesiod Th., 26-8, with Pucci (1987) esp. 165-72, 181-208. By providing an occasion for allotting proper 
“shares” (timaiv), communal meals take on a socially stabilising role. 
80 Nestor stipulates that the leader’s role is not only to declare an epos but to listen to one as well 
(ejpakou'sai, Od. 9.100), and act for the communal good (eij" ajgaqovn, 9.102). Thus he prepares his advice: 
aujta;r ejgw;n ejrevw w{" moi dokei' ei\nai a[rista (9.103). 
81 The narrative signals his move to more intense negotiation with marked vocabulary: uJfaivnein mh'tin 
(9.93). 
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Achaean community and to the narrativisation of the fall of Troy. The institution of the 
assembly does not exist somehow prior to the Iliad, but because of it. 
In saying this, I place emphasis on the involvement of the poem’s audience, who 
are not only being led through the activation of various institutions, but are also invited 
to reflect upon that process. A case to point is the role of the main player in moving 
affairs to council, Nestor. Though praised for his negotiation skills by Hellenistic critics 
in particular,82 some recent scholars have shown anxiety at Nestor’s deference to 
authority. He defers to Agamemnon in the quarrel with Achilles (1.277-9), in accepting 
the validity of Agamemnon’s lying dream (2.79-83),83 and at the prelude of the embassy 
(9.103-5) – all of which worsen the crisis. Though it could be said that Nestor represents 
the virtues of the tradition,84 equally we could understand him as a remnant of a past 
when everyone was indeed deferent to the king on the basis of status alone. Indeed Peter 
Rose has suggestively called Nestor’s (and Odysseus’s) adherence to an absolute notion 
of Agamemnon’s authority “residual”.85 This is interesting, because in the Odyssey Nestor, 
along with Odysseus, is shown to be no lover of debate.86 Even as the text establishes the 
boundaries to the institution of the assembly, we are made to think about our role in 
                                                
82 For a discussion, see Murray (1965) 177. Cf. Schofield (1999) 29. 
83 See Taplin (1992) 90. 
84 Especially in his ability to spin a tale, as his manipulation of Patroclus testifies: R. P. Martin (2000). 
85 Rose (1997) 163. Hammer (1997b) suggests that Nestor adheres to a “might-is-right” notion of kingship, 
which should be contrasted to a more “interdependent” notion of politics – a “politics of mediation” –
embodied in the figure of Achilles (20, 21). Cf. Hammer (2002) 127-42. For the role of Odysseus and 
Nestor in supporting Agamemnon: Schofield (1986) 26ff.; Sale (1994), 32ff. 
86 See, for example, his description of the catastrophic debate after the fall of Troy (Od. 3.148-50). Ah, how 
things were different when he and Odysseus were in control. The two of them never fell out (ou[te pot j eijn 
ajgorh'/ divc j ejbazovmen ou[t j ejni; boulh'/, 3.127), but were always of the same mind (ajll j e{na qumo;n e[conte 
novw/ kai; ejpivfroni boulh'/, 3.128). 
  - 30 - 
legitimising or suppressing dissent: who can dissent (Thersites)? how much dissent 
should we allow? and when (Nestor)? 
If we are more sceptical about Nestor’s role, we may want to distinguish between 
the council and assembly. From what we have said, the former appears more fully 
formed, restrictive and more closely associated with the king; the latter less ordered, 
open to everyone’s gaze and more highly competitive. In other words, the poem 
represents the council as a more conventional arena for decision-making than the newly 
activated and empowered arena of public debate.87  
One later occurrence of the word agora underlines the evolutionary nature of 
narrative. As a prelude to a significant one-off speech by the Achaean warrior, Thoas,88 
the narrator underlines his skill as a speaker (15.283-4): 
ajgorh'/ dev eJ pau'roi  jAcaiw'n  
nivkwn, oJppovte kou'roi ejrivsseian peri; muvqwn: 
In the assembly, few of the Achaeans could beat him, whenever the young men vied with 
words. 
The introduction affords a brief glimpse of a world closer to home. And what we learn is 
that dissent in the assembly is a normal activity, a “whenever”. Given the detail that it is a 
young man’s sport, it is perhaps even part of what one has to do to prove oneself as a 
man. Whereas in the first assembly, the strife (eris) between Agamemnon and Achilles 
was represented as a crisis, even if Achilles’ dissent had been necessary, the implicit 
premise here is of the social acceptability of eris. As a matter of fact, this narratorial gloss on 
                                                
87 Haubold (2000) 60 comments that “institutional progress is not the Iliad’s prime interest”. This, I 
believe, lends rather too much authority to Nestor’s management. (Haubold makes the comment in the 
context of Nestor preparing the Iliad to accommodate the catalogue of the ships.) 
88 Hammer (1997b) 9 notes how Thoas uses the formula peiqwvmeqa pavnte" as a sign of his concern to 
persuade his audience. 
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the assembly is typically passed over in discussions of debate, perhaps because, by this 
stage in the narrative, strife – in the form of dissent – has been made institutional in the 
Achaean assembly. 
 
It remains to be seen whether Achilles can be received back into the community. The 
debate of book 19 explores that issue and invites reflection on the Iliad’s achievement. 
 
III Let us remember: putting a value on debate 
 
The final Achaean assembly appears somewhat out of place in our enquiry. After all, I 
have just argued the performance of the assembly culminates in book nine when 
Diomedes prescribes it as an institution that allows dissent. What can the last scene of 
assembly add to our understanding? In a sense, this assembly is out of place even in the 
narrative. We know that Achilles will be returning to battle. The decision has already been 
made. What need for an assembly now?89 
Its formal institutionalisation is the most elaborate yet (19.40-6):  
aujta;r oJ bh' para; qi'na qalavssh" di'o"  jAcilleu;" 
smerdaleva ijavcwn, w\rsen d j h{rwa"  jAcaiouv". 
kaiv rJ j oi{ per to; pavro" ge new'n ejn ajgw''ni mevneskon, 
oi{ te kubernh'tai kai; e[con oijhvi>a nhw'n 
kai; tamivai para; nhusi;n e[san, sivtoio doth're", 
kai; mh;n oiJ tovte g j eij" ajgorh;n i[san, ou{nek j  jAcilleu;" 
ejxefavnh, dhro;n de; mavch" ejpevpaut j ajlegeinh'". 
                                                
89 Formal reconciliation takes place: Donlan (1979) 62; yet Achilles is hardly reintegrated into the 
community: Seaford (1994) 67. 
  - 32 - 
Divine Achilles walked along the shore, shouting terribly, and he roused the Achaean 
heroes. And even those who before used to wait in the agon of the ships – those who were 
both helmsmen and wielded the ships’ oars and, when beside the ships, were stewards giving 
out the food – even they at that time came to the agora, since Achilles had appeared, and 
for a long time he had ceased from grievous battle.  
Many elements are striking about this description. First, the group whom Achilles gathers 
are not the laoi but – uniquely – “Achaean heroes”, which recalls the proem’s location of 
the Iliad in a bygone world (1.1-5).90 Second, there is the odd detail that “everyone came 
even those who before used to wait in the agon of the ships”, a curious phrase that only 
occurs for the duration Achilles is absent from battle.91 The point is picked up by what 
follows: “they came to the agora at that time because Achilles appeared, who for a long time 
had ceased from warring.” The period of Achilles’ absence relates directly to the duration of 
the Iliad, which had begun with him withdrawing from the group after having upheld the 
importance of speaking freely in the assembly. This assembly’s opening frame invites the 
poem’s audience to reflect on the Iliad as a whole and assess its narrativisation of dissent. 
It is a debate on debate. 
                                                
90 The mention of heroes immediately locates the Iliad in a past era familiar to us from Hesiod’s myth of 
five ages, the “race of heroes” being the age before ours (Op. 156-73). Graziosi and Haubold (forthcoming) 
suggest that archaic Greek hexameter – that is to say Homeric and Hesiodic epic – share a vision of the 
cosmos and how it developed through time. In this sense they are foundational narratives. 
91 The standard gloss is that the phrase new'n ejn ajgw''ni “maintains the original sense of ajgwvn, 
‘gathering’…, whence derives its post-Homeric sense ‘contest’”: Janko (1992) 275-6n.426-8; cf. Leaf 
(1960[1886-8]) 132n.428; Willcock (1978) 236n.298; M. Edwards (1991) 240n.42-5; N. Richardson (1993) 
200-201n.258. But see Ellsworth (1974), who proposes that agon even here signifies “contest”: it occurs only 
while Achilles is absent from the field, as an indication of the increased threat to – or battle for – the 
Achaean ships. Cf. his 1971 PhD thesis (University Microfilms, Ann Arbor). 
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Achilles, addressing Agamemnon alone, represents their struggle in terms of its 
effect on the group: “but I believe that the Achaeans have been long angry about our 
strife” (aujta;r  jAcaiou;" / dhro;n ejmh'" kai; sh'" e[rido" mnhvsesqai oji?w, 19.63-4). He 
even accepts the common soldiery’s view, as formulated by Ajax, that it had all been for 
a woman (ei{neka kouvrh", 19.58).92 Now, Achilles urges, they should let bygones be 
bygones; it is not necessary “to be always angry” (aijei; meneainevmen, 19.68). The action 
of the Iliad appears to have been aptly (if over simply) summarised. The assembly could 
end here. This is, at any rate, how the internal audience react. Denied any kind of 
response in the first assembly, here they are described as happy now that Achilles has let 
his rage go.93 Yet the Iliad refrains from dissolving the assembly quite yet. Instead, 
Achilles’ “Iliadic” desire to do battle is frustrated by two opponents of his narrative 
tale:94 first Agamemnon, who again tries to maintain control over the events; more telling 
is the mediation of Odysseus, who introduces into the narrative an Odyssean motif, the 
concern for the belly. 
The framing of Agamemnon’s response immediately confronts us with the 
question of what we think is going on: the narrator describes how Agamemnon speaks 
from where he is sitting,95 and from a position “not in the middle” (oujd j ejn mevssoisin, 
19.77). Up until now, the narrator had been silent on how the agent addresses the 
                                                
92 M. Edwards (1991) 241n.56-73. Cf. Ajax Il. 9.637-8. 
93 Il. 19.74. ejcavrhsan occurs at one other place after a speech, when the Greeks and Trojans, having heard 
the oaths, rejoice thinking that the war will soon be over (3.111). There too reaction is premature. 
94 Owen (1947) 91 notes how the poet anticipates our reaction by “representing Achilles as exasperated 
almost beyond endurance by the very thing that is exasperating us”. Page (1959) 313 – perhaps 
unsurprisingly – is exasperated! 
95 Standing to speak appears to be the common posture: Arend (1933) 116-18. There has been debate over 
whether Agamemnon really is sitting (since it is so odd), but see Clay (1995) 72nn.1-8. 
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assembly; using these details it is probably right to surmise that the speaker stands in the 
middle of the group, thereby signifying his words as in the public interest, open to all, the 
possession of none96 – which fits into our analysis of the assembly as allowing dissent. 
What then do we make of Agamemnon not standing in the middle? Again we find the 
narrator posing a question in the way the assembly is framed. Again a judgement must be 
made that impacts upon how the assembly is understood.97 From what we have just said 
about the middle, Agamemnon’s posture suggests an unwillingness to enter into a 
contest of words.98 This is in itself, of course, an antagonistic gesture, but one that seeks 
to maintain a hierarchical superiority, exactly that which has been challenged throughout 
in previous scenes of the assembly.  
In this last assembly, then, it appears that Agamemnon is still trying to assert his 
authority. Understood in this way certain oddities of his speech make sense, such as the 
round about way he prefaces what he has to say (19.79-80): 
eJstaovto" me;n kalo;n ajkouvein, oujde; e[oiken 
uJbbavllein: calepo;n ga;r ejpistamevnw/ per ejovnti. 
It is good to listen to the man standing, nor is it right to interrupt him. For it is difficult 
even for one who is knowledgeable. 
Agamemnon’s point is less than clear, especially given he is sitting. Rabel though points 
out that uJbbavllein (“to interrupt”) occurs here for only the second time; it was first used 
                                                
96 As Detienne (1996) 91-102 explains, putting goods into the middle (es meson) is to put them into the 
common domain, rendering them common property and, therefore, “up for grabs”. The expression es 
meson is later applied to speeches. 
97 Thornton (1984) 128-9 regards these gestures as those of a supplicant posture, a view criticised by Taplin 
(1990) 75. M. Edwards (1991) 243-5n.76-84 interprets Agamemnon’s seated position as publicly 
demonstrating physical incapacity to contrast with Achilles’ recent battle shyness. 
98 He avoids addressing Achilles directly (Phlei?dh/... ejndeivxomai, 19.83), which is his strategy throughout. 
Cf. 19.189. See M. Edwards (1991) 245n.83. 
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by the narrator to describe Achilles interrupting Agamemnon in the original quarrel.99 
Agamemnon’s generalisation appears pointedly aimed at Achilles and specifically at the 
challenge to his – Agamemnon’s – authority. Along similar lines he relates a paradeigma 
about the power of the goddess Deception (Atê) over all, even Zeus himself. Other 
characters narrate Olympian action, but none do so quoting the words of gods. 
Moreover, he applies the paradeigma to his own situation not, as in all other cases, to the 
situation of his addressee100 – and not altogether surprisingly he aligns himself to the 
King of the gods!101 This is Agamemnon’s version of the Iliad.102 Yet, the example he 
chooses, in which Zeus discovers his words spinning out of control, spin back on 
Agamemnon.103 Another more appropriate role is open to him, playing Eurystheus to 
Achilles’ Heracles; how Agamemnon would fare in such a comparison is clear.104 Once 
more he fails conspicuously to control the narrative, which undermines his authority 
irrevocably: his last words are in this debate. Once more in the assembly we see the Iliad’s 
agenda of privileging dissent. This is, after all, Achilles’ narrative. 
                                                
99 The only other use of uJbbavllein is the hapax uJpoblhvdhn at 1.292: Rabel (1991). Cf. M. Edwards (1991) 
244. 
100 Vivante (1990) 99 suggests that Agamemnon has made the paradeigma up. Certainly it is right to note the 
spin Agamemnon puts on it.  
101 Lohmann (1970) 77f. explores how Agamemnon interlaces his a[th with Zeus’s. 
102 Rabel (1991). 
103 Hera tricks Zeus into making a promise the effect of which renders Heracles subservient to Eurystheus. 
According to Heiden (1991), the paradeigma demonstrates the “dialogic” process of communication. 
104 It “establishes him as a parallel to Eurystheus, and Achilles as a parallel to Herakles. Agamemnon’s own 
ultimate inferiority to Achilles is then indirectly recognised”: Davidson (1980) 200. Rabel (1991) maintains, 
however, that Agamemnon comes off best in this match-up. 
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Yet, Achilles’ march to war is halted by a third party, Odysseus, who insists on 
following formal procedure: first reconciliation, second eating.105 Agamemnon then 
replies to Odysseus, Achilles answers Agamemnon. Odysseus Achilles. Thus in this 
assembly no two speakers respond directly to each other. At one level, then, this 
structuring of the debate avoids replaying the contest between Achilles and Agamemnon 
or, for that matter, between Achilles and Odysseus. At another, it allows tensions to 
remain latent. In addressing Achilles, for example, Odysseus quotes Agamemnon’s first 
words to him in that fateful assembly.106 There may too be something a little unsettling 
about the way this hero, who is famous from the rival epic for tricky persuasiveness, 
(stage-)manages the assembly and keeps a powerful check on dissent. 107  
A subtle irony underscores this scene that speaks volumes for the Iliad’s narrative 
strategy as a whole. Odysseus’s intervention holds up the telling of the Iliad and the 
deeds (still to be witnessed) of its hero Achilles. In reply to Agamemnon, Achilles 
exhorts “now let us remember battle” (nu'n de; mnhswvmeqa cavrmh" / ai\ya mavl j, 
19.148-9). When Odysseus objects, he is even more explicit: nothing is of concern 
(mevmhlen) to him, but “murder and blood and harsh groans of men” (ajlla; fovno" te kai; 
ai|ma kai; ajrgalevo" stovno" ajndrw'n, 19.214). This striking line has an epigrammatic 
quality that could pass off as a summing up of the Iliad and its scenes of bloody 
                                                
105 Odysseus’s proposal that Agamemnon has his gifts of recompense carried into the middle (oijsevtw ej" 
mesvshn ajgorhvn, 19.173) equates to a redistribution of booty and avoids placing Achilles under obligation 
to Agamemnon: Detienne (1996) 93-5. This is not just about gift-giving; Briseis has to be formally returned 
with an oath that she is intact for the reconciliation to be perceived as effective. 
106 “Don’t, though you are noble, divine-like Achilles” (mh; dh; ou{tw", ajgaqov" per ejwvn, qeoeivkel j  jAcilleu' 
, 19.155=1.131). 
107 Contrast Hammer (1997a) 358. He notes the importance of Odysseus’s manipulation of social ritual 
(being aimed at co-opting Achilles back into the system), but does not regard it as potentially aggressive. 
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warfare.108 Even so, Odysseus insists on remembering to eat.109 In doing so, he not only 
reduces the symbolic significance of fasting to the essentials – the impracticality of 
fighting on an empty belly; given the importance of the belly to the Odyssean tradition,110 
Odysseus’s obstruction could also be regarded as programmatic.111 Achilles’ resistance to 
Odysseus would then be a rejection of the Odyssean tradition. Holding onto the memory 
of grief acts as a stimulus to attaining (his) glory.112 
Yet, even this explanation does not exhaust the possibilities of contest. After all, 
in spite of Achilles’ flat refusal to sing along to an Odyssean hymn-book, the telling of 
his tale is held up by the intrusion of gift-giving and eating. But that, I suggest, is the very 
strength of the Iliad’s strategy of dissent. It accommodates a spectrum of diverse, even 
competing perspectives.113 Its commitment to dissent in the assembly is tested by the 
intervention of the hero of the rival tradition. By conceding ground to this competing 
voice, the Iliad demonstrates the value of dissent. Who would agree with Achilles that the 
                                                
108 In an imagined contest between “Homer” and “Hesiod”, the king judges “Homer” inferior on such a 
basis: Certamen 205-10. 
109 memnh'sqai povsio" kai; ejdhtuvo" (19.231). 
110 The sentiment “for no man fasting can fight a whole day” crops up in Odysseus’s tale at Od. 9.161, 556; 
10.183, 475; 12.29. 
111 Pucci (1987) 165ff. For tension between Odysseus and Achilles in the Iliad see n.67 above, with Nagy 
(1979) on the embassy of book nine. The conflict is taken up in the Odyssey with Achilles left in the 
underworld bemoaning his early death while Odysseus continues on his journey home: A. Edwards (1985).  
112 Pucci (1987) 169-71. Achilles only “remembers eating” after – finally – giving up his wrath (24.601). 
113 Saying that, the text never shakes off the suspicion of unilateralism entirely: Achilles’ retreat to his ships 
is a retreat into a unilateral assertion of his own authority in reaction to the failure of his open dissent in 
the public arena of debate. 
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only thing of concern in the Iliad is “murder, blood and harsh groans” – least of all 
Achilles himself?114 
 
The assembly of book nineteen clearly does provide some sort of closure to the 
disruption and strife that has gone before. Everyone is present; Achilles and 
Agamemnon are not allowed to fall out again; Odysseus employs due procedure to 
formalise reconciliation. Nevertheless, counterproductive forms of dissent still pervade 
and render the consensus precarious in many ways. The Iliad’s final assembly, in staging a 
debate over the efficacy of its narrative strategy on debate, enacts the very strength of 
that strategy. 
 
***** 
 
I began this paper by remarking on the widespread interest in exploring how the Iliad 
might relate to a socio-political framework and the failed attempts at locating the Iliad 
with any certainty in that landscape. My purpose throughout has not been to consider 
whether or not the assembly existed as an institution in Homeric society, but to explore 
how the Iliad represents debate and what significance might be attached to that. One 
reason why the Homeric agora has proven such a contestable arena of debate could be 
because scholars have approached the Iliad’s institutions by looking for a “ready-made” 
                                                
114 The closing verses of the Iliad passage recited by “Homer” in the Certamen – “Very hard of heart he would 
have been, who could then have seen that labour with joy and felt no pain” (203-4) – in the words of Jim Porter, 
“undercut the scene of war he is describing” (taken from his unpublished paper “Contest and Contestation 
in the Certamen” delivered at the 2002 APA meeting in New Orleans and kindly lent to me). 
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system.115 I have shown, however, that assemblies are not independent of context but 
part of a series of representations that progressively explores the possibility for, and 
value of, dissent in the community. Moreover, by experiencing the assembly as a process – 
that is, a series of struggles not a closed system, the poem’s audience become implicated 
in realising it as an institution that makes use of disagreement. When Achilles dissents 
from Agamemnon in the first assembly, the structure does not exist that can support 
such an action, which is why Athena must intervene. But by the time we get to the 
assembly of book nine with the initial dissenting voice, Achilles, isolated from the 
community, Diomedes can say that fighting with words in the assembly “is the custom”. 
The assembly of book nineteen invites reflection on that achievement. 
This conclusion differentiates my study from previous attempts to place the Iliad 
in an emerging institutional framework. Richard Seaford, for example, emphasises the 
poem’s ritual ending as anticipating the fifth-century polis: with Achilles’ reception of 
Priam in book twenty four, the poem suggests a different conception of relationships.116 
Dean Hammer has suggested that the Iliad should be regarded as a serious document of 
political thought by virtue of its examination of authority as dramatised by Achilles’ 
withdrawal from the group. He regards Achilles’ role in the funeral games of Patroclus as 
founding a new kind of political relationship, based on “the recognition and successful 
                                                
115 Hammer (1997b) 3: “[I]t is precisely the absence of formalized political institutions that makes any 
mediation between Agamemnon and Achilles so difficult.” Cf. Finley (2002[1954]) 69-72, 106; Donlan 
(1979) 65; Ruzé (1997); Hölkeskamp (1998). 
116 Seaford (1994) 176: “The reconciliation of Achilles and Priam is often said to represent, as Macleod 
puts it, ‘the value of humanity and fellow-feeling’ (1982, 16). This is true as far as it goes. But the 
construction and the power of the scene derived not just from the abstract consideration (natural for us) of 
shared humanity but from the concrete role of death ritual in social practice, in creating solidarity between 
potential enemies.” 
  - 40 - 
mediation of difference”.117 Hammer’s understanding, therefore, of the Iliad’s 
performance of political thought, privileges Achilles’ performance in book twenty three. 
Greg Nagy posits an even earlier moment where, he believes, the Iliad alludes to a 
political community; that is, the trial on Achilles’ shield in book eighteen. He writes: 
In the end the logic of the litigation scene spills over, paradoxically, into 
the logic of an ever-expanding outermost circle – that is, people who are 
about to hear the Iliad. These people, I argue, are to become ultimately the 
people of the polis.118 
With this observation, Nagy implies a connection between witnessing the Iliad and the 
formation of a political community.119 I suggest that the Iliad helps to construct a political 
community by virtue of the ways in which it structures interpretation as institutional. It 
begins a process towards achieving a political community from its beginning through 
Achilles’ dissent in the assembly, which takes place under divine patronage and which the 
Achaeans, and the poem’s audience, must deal with. 
It is for this reason, I believe, we never quite get to the polis in the text itself. The 
audience themselves, as they experience the assembly, make it work as a central 
                                                
117 Hammer (1997b) 21. He explains (20): “Whereas Nestor is always able to pronounce final judgement on 
a particular situation, we see in the situation with Achilles [in the Funeral Games] a much more complex, 
interdependent politics in which decisions give rise to new problems… We have, it seems, a new politics 
born of and immersed in contending (and not easily resolvable) interests.” Cf. Hammer (2002) 134-43. 
Hammer, like me, locates the source of the crisis in the struggle between Achilles and Agamemnon in Iliad 
(1), but whereas he sees the funeral games as “political re-enactment” (13ff), the agora remains the 
institution that cannot support dissent (13). 
118 Nagy (1997) 206. 
119 For the performance of the Iliad at the Panathenaia: Nagy (1996) 65-112; (1999). Cf. Haubold (2000) 
145-90. In this context, the Iliad could serve as a foundation narrative for Greek poleis and, more 
specifically, Athens. One answer to Achilles is Athenian democracy. 
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institution of the polis.120 Vernant describes a process by which the centring of the city 
“on the agora, the communal space” impacts upon how people mentally view their 
world.121 Similarly, I suggest, experiencing debate in the Iliad helps construct an audience 
engaged in thinking about how people interact with each other in the context of an arena 
in which public concerns are raised and contested. By establishing a place in its narrative 
to investigate debate, the Iliad invites the audience to reflect on where they are to going 
to draw the lines, over what they will enter the debate. We are invited to look beyond the 
single (imagined or real) performance context to an Iliad that operates as aetiological – or 
foundational – for a world of “today”.122 The text itself does not perform politics, as 
Hammer suggests. Its audience are the ones performing politics.123 
                                                
120 Morris (1996) 20 discusses a pre-democratic stage where members of a group, who believe “they are all 
about equally well qualified to participate in the decisions of the group”, govern themselves “through some 
sort of democratic process”. He denies the relevance of his “strong principle of equality” to the Iliad (31). 
121 Vernant (1982[1962]) 47-8. 
122 The Iliad’s heroic world of the past is exploited “for the way in which it can, as a purely fictional world 
can, cast light upon the structures of the present world”: Osborne (1996) 33. 
123 The institutional dissent of many friends and colleagues has helped make this performance, especially 
the following: first, Simon Goldhill – there would have been no point without the agony of his 
supervisions; Johannes Haubold, who helped me find my voice in the debate; Bruce Heiden, for having 
inspired my interest in the Iliad; the audiences of this paper’s various forms at the 2002 CAC in Edinburgh, 
the Cambridge Literary Seminar and Merton college, Oxford; finally, the anonymous PCPS reviewer, Jason 
König, Kyriaki Konstantinidou, Don Lavigne, Jim Porter and Alex Stevens for helping me produce fewer 
errors and present a more robust challenge.  
